Stefano Pagliari

Stefano Pagliari

CITY, University of London

Political Economy, Political Economy of Financial Regulation, Governance of the Global Economy, Economic Diplomacy, Trade Diplomacy

Biography

Dr Stefano Pagliari‘s research concentrates on the field of international political economy, and in particular on the political economy of financial regulation. He has written on a number of issues related to the politics of the international monetary and financial system, such as financial industry lobbying, regulatory capture, EU-US financial diplomacy, and international financial institutions. His work has appeared in a number of peer-reviewed journals including International Organization, Socio-Economic Review, Review of International Political Economy, New Political Economy, Journal of European Integration. Before joining City University London in July 2013, Dr Pagliari was a Fellow in International Political Economy in the International Relations Department at the London School of Economics & Political Science – LSE, as well as a Visiting Scholar at Initiative for Policy Dialogue, Columbia University.

Research Interest

“Political economy of financial regulation (in particular OTC derivatives, hedge funds, rating agencies, banking) – Financial industry lobbying and regulatory capture – US-EU financial regulatory relationship – International financial regulatory institutions (in particular the Financial Stability Board and IOSCO)”.

 

Education

  • Ph.D., Accounting & Finance, University of Strathclyde, Scotland
  • M.S.F., Finance, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, 2006
  • M.B.A., Taxation, Golden Gate University, San Francisco, CA, 1983

Publications

Pagliari S. (2014). International Harmonization of Financial Regulation? The Politics of Global Diffusion of the Basel Capital Accord. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, 16(4), pp. 673-675.

Pagliari S. (2015). Financial industry power and regulatory policies: What lessons from the global financial crisis? Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche, 10(2), pp. 209–232.

Books